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 Econometrica , Vol. 82, No. 6 (November, 2014), 2005-2039
 THE INTRINSIC VALUE OF DECISION RIGHTS
 By Björn Bartling, Ernst Fehr, and Holger Herz1
 Philosophers, psychologists, and economists have long argued that certain decision
 rights carry not only instrumental value but may also be valuable for their own sake.
 The ideas of autonomy, freedom, and liberty derive their intuitive appeal - at least
 partly - from an assumed positive intrinsic value of decision rights. Providing clean
 evidence for the existence of this intrinsic value and measuring its size, however, is
 intricate. Here, we develop a method capable of achieving these goals. The data reveal
 that the large majority of our subjects intrinsically value decision rights beyond their in-
 strumental benefit. The intrinsic valuation of decision rights has potentially important
 consequences for corporate governance, human resource management, and optimal
 job design: it may explain why managers value power, why employees appreciate jobs
 with task discretion, why individuals sort into self-employment, and why the realloca-
 tion of decision rights is often very difficult and cumbersome. Our method and results
 may also prove useful in developing an empirical revealed preference foundation for
 concepts such as "freedom of choice" and "individual autonomy."
 Keywords: Decision rights, authority, private benefits of control.
 1. INTRODUCTION
 The optimal allocation of decision rights is important for achieving ef-
 ficient outcomes in organizations, markets, and society at large. In economics,
 the incomplete contracting literature led to an extensive analysis of institutions
 and organizations in terms of concepts like control rights, decision-making
 rules, or authority (e.g., Simon (1951), Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and
 Moore (1990), Aghion and Tiróle (1997), Dessein (2002), Bartling, Fehr, and
 Schmidt (2013)). A common feature in these models is that decision rights are
 viewed as purely instrumental for achieving certain outcomes. In this paper, we
 examine whether decision rights are only a means to an end or whether they
 carry an intrinsic value beyond their instrumental value of providing the power
 to enforce preferred outcomes.2
 lrThe Walras-Bowley Lecture that Ernst Fehr presented at the North American Summer Meet-
 ing of the Econometric Society at Northwestern University, Evanston, in June 2012 was based on
 the content of this paper. We would like to thank our referees and the editor for very valuable
 and helpful guidance. We are also grateful to Alain Cohn, Charles Efferson, Jon Elster, Bob
 Gibbons, Herb Gintis, Oliver Hart, Michael Kösfeld, Rafael Lalive, Igor Letina, Nick Netzer,
 Bastiaan Oud, Michael Powell, Clemens Puppe, Klaus M. Schmidt, Andrei Shleifer, Eric van
 den Steen, Roberto Weber, Tom Wilkening, Christian Zehnder, and Florian Zimmermann, as
 well as seminar participants at Aarhus, British Columbia, Frankfurt, Harvard, Lausanne, MIT,
 Northwestern, Rotterdam, Royal Holloway, and Zurich for helpful comments and suggestions.
 2The idea that decision rights are intrinsically valued already found a particular manifestation
 in Adam Smith's lectures on jurisprudence delivered at the University of Glasgow in 1762/63. He
 argued that slavery will never be abolished in a democracy of slave holders because "the love of
 domination and authority and the pleasure men take in having everything] done by their express
 © 2014 The Econometric Society DOI: 10.3982/ECTA1 1573
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 Why would individuals value decision rights beyond their instrumental ben-
 efits? Social psychologists argue that human needs constitute a source of the
 intrinsic value of power and autonomy. Power is a dominant human need
 in McClelland's (1975) motivation theory, and the self-determination theory
 by Deci and Ryan (1985) hypothesizes that autonomy is "essential for ongo-
 ing psychological growth, integrity, and well-being" (Deci and Ryan (2000,
 p. 229)). Similarly, Frey, Benz, and Stutzer (2004) argued that independence
 and autonomy at the workplace are sources of procedural utility that raise hap-
 piness. In economic philosophy, the capabilities approach by Sen and Nuss-
 baum (e.g., Sen (1985), Nussbaum (2000)) advances a related argument. They
 emphasized that not only outcomes, but also the freedom of choice, are im-
 portant for a person's quality of life: "The central capabilities are not just in-
 strumental for further pursuits: they are held to have value in themselves, in
 making the life that includes them fully human" (Nussbaum (2000, p. 74)). Fi-
 nally, in moral and political philosophy, John Stuart Mill argued that liberty
 is "one of the elements of wellbeing" (1859, Chapter III), and individual au-
 tonomy is regarded as a basic moral and political value (see, e.g., Christman
 (2011)).
 The difficulty in assessing whether individuals value decision rights intrinsi-
 cally arises from the necessity to separate the intrinsic value from the instru-
 mental value. We designed an experiment that achieves this separation on the
 basis of subjects' revealed preferences. Our experiment consists of two parts.
 In Part 1, we implement a delegation game in which a principal (she) can keep
 her decision right or delegate it to an agent (him). If the principal keeps the
 decision right, she can unilaterally determine (i) which of two available project
 alternatives to implement and (ii) how much costly effort she wants to spend
 to implement the chosen project successfully. If the principal delegates the de-
 cision right, the agent can unilaterally determine the choices in (i) and (ii). The
 principal faces a trade-off when she decides whether to delegate the decision
 right. On the one hand, the party who holds the decision right has to bear the
 cost of implementation effort. On the other hand, the party can also choose
 the project alternative, and one project leads to a higher expected payoff for
 the principal, while the other project leads to a higher expected payoff for the
 agent. The effort determines the probability of success for the chosen project.
 The choices of the party holding the decision right therefore induce a lottery
 over monetary payments for both the principal and the agent.
 The key innovation in Part 1 of our experiment consists of implementing
 an incentive compatible method that elicits the principal's point of indiffer-
 ence between keeping and delegating the decision right. To this end, the prin-
 cipal has to choose a minimum requirement for the agent's implementation
 orders, rather than to condescend to bargain and treat with those whom they look upon as their
 inferiors and are inclined to use in a haughty way; this love of domination and tyrannizing, I say,
 will make it impossible for slaves in a free country ever to recover their liberty" (Smith (1978,
 p. 186)). We owe this reference to Jon Elster.
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 effort. Without knowing the principal's minimum requirement, the agent pri-
 vately chooses a binding effort level, which is implemented if delegation actu-
 ally takes place. If the agent's effort is above or equal to the minimum require-
 ment, delegation takes place. If the agent's effort is strictly below the minimum
 requirement, the decision right remains with the principal. Thus, the minimum
 requirement does not restrain the agent's effort choice in any way. It only de-
 termines, jointly with the agent's effort choice, whether delegation takes place.
 By determining a minimal effort requirement, the principal can keep the deci-
 sion right whenever the agent's actual effort choice would make her worse off
 and delegate the right otherwise. The mechanism ensures that it is optimal for
 the principal to set the minimum effort requirement in such a way that if the
 agent were to choose exactly the minimum requirement, the principal is just
 indifferent between keeping and delegating the decision right.
 The principal's own effort and project choices define a "control lottery,"
 and the minimum effort requirement together with the project alternative that
 gives the higher expected monetary payoff to the agent defines a "delegation
 lottery." Note that the principal's utility when keeping control consists of the
 monetary value of the control lottery plus a possible intrinsic utility component
 associated with being in control that reflects the intrinsic value of the decision
 right. If, instead, delegation takes place and the minimum effort requirement
 is chosen, the principal's utility consists of the monetary value of the delega-
 tion lottery. Consequently, at the elicited point of indifference, the following
 equality holds:
 monetary value of the control lottery + intrinsic value of decision right
 = monetary value of the delegation lottery.
 We measure the monetary values of the delegation and control lotteries in
 Part 2 of the experiment by eliciting the principal's certainty equivalents of
 the delegation and control lotteries. Importantly, this value elicitation takes
 place outside the context of the delegation game. In Part 2, the principals are
 confronted with the lotteries their decisions in the delegation game generated,
 but these lotteries are now given exogenously, meaning that the intrinsic value
 component is absent. It follows that if the certainty equivalent of the control
 lottery is smaller than the certainty equivalent of the delegation lottery, then
 the principal must place a positive intrinsic value on the decision right. In other
 words, the principal is willing to pay a "control premium" if she intrinsically
 values the decision right, and this control premium can be measured by the
 difference between the certainty equivalent of the delegation lottery and the
 certainty equivalent of the control lottery.
 Our main finding is that principals indeed assign significantly larger certainty
 equivalents to the delegation lotteries than to the control lotteries in Part 2.
 Each principal played the delegation game 10 times, using 10 different param-
 eterizations, and on average, the principals value the delegation lotteries 16.7
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 percent more than the control lotteries. At the individual level, the data show
 that the large majority of the principals assign a positive intrinsic value to deci-
 sion rights. Moreover, our result is found consistently across the ten different
 parameterizations. We also find that the individual intrinsic valuations are cor-
 related across the different parameterizations, suggesting that it is rooted in a
 relatively stable individual preference.
 We do not want to argue in this paper that decision rights are always in-
 trinsically valuable, and we expect situational determinants to affect this value
 crucially. For example, if decision rights involve the choice between fair and un-
 fair outcomes, some people might prefer not making these decisions (Bartling
 and Fischbacher (2012)). We address two potential situational determinants by
 systematically varying (i) the stake size of the decisions and (ii) the conflict of
 interest between the principal and the agent with regard to the project alter-
 native in the ten rounds in Part 1. With regard to stake size, we find that the
 intrinsic value of decision rights is not just a fixed amount, but that it increases
 roughly in proportion to the payoffs under consideration. With regard to con-
 flict of interest, we find that the intrinsic value of decision rights is lower if the
 principal's conflict of interest with the agent is higher. This finding suggests
 that, while the instrumental value of decision rights is clearly higher if conflicts
 of interest are higher, having control in situations with a payoff conflict is less
 intrinsically valuable.
 Our experimental results contribute to the corporate finance and gover-
 nance literatures, where non-contractible private benefits of control are at the
 center of the debate (e.g., Aghion and Bolton (1992)). While private ben-
 efits are often interpreted as being material in nature, such as the tangible
 perquisites top executives enjoy (Jensen and Meckling (1976)), the literature
 also refers to "private benefits of control as the 'psychic' value some sharehold-
 ers attribute simply to being in control" (Dyck and Zingales (2004, p. 540)).
 Similarly, to motivate private benefits of control, Hart and Moore (1995)
 claimed that "among other things, managers have goals, such as the pursuit of
 power" (p. 568). However, the measurement of psychic benefits of control has
 escaped precise measurement until now. Our experimental study provides evi-
 dence for the relevance of private benefits of control and the theoretical litera-
 ture that evolved around them.3 The relevance of this source of utility has also
 been discussed in the entrepreneurship literature. Hamilton (2000) showed
 that entrepreneurs effectively forego earnings for their self-employment; the
 same has also been suggested for scientists (see Stern (2004)). Pugsley and
 3Anecdotal evidence suggests that the intrinsic value of decision rights might even inhibit
 mergers due to disputes over the allocation of decision rights in the merged company. For ex-
 ample, the planned merger between Glaxo-Wellcome and SmithKline Beecham in 1998, which
 would have been the largest merger ever at that time, failed because the top executives of the
 merging firms were unable to agree on the division of decision rights in the merged entity. This
 case of merger failure was also described as a "clash of egos" (Morrow (1998)). The firms finally
 merged two years later, after the retirement of the SmithKline Beecham CEO.
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 Hurst (2011) documented that non-pecuniary motives are a major driver of
 the decision to enter self-employment, and Moskowitz and Vissing-j0rgensen
 (2002) argued that the corresponding wage differentials may be as large as
 143% of total annual income.
 Our findings are also related to the literature on incomplete contracts and
 the delegation of authority (e.g., Aghion and Tiróle (1997)). Non-contractible
 intrinsic benefits of control are likely to bias principals towards keeping de-
 cision rights, possibly to the detriment of other parties within the organiza-
 tion and of organizational efficiency.4 For example, Fehr, Herz, and Wilken-
 ing (2013) found significant underdelegation of decision rights from principals
 to agents in experimentally controlled situations in which delegation would
 clearly be preferable for both parties in terms of expected monetary pay-
 offs. Similarly, Owens, Grossman, and Fackler (2014) found that individuals
 are willing to sacrifice expected earnings to retain control.5 Falk and Kösfeld
 (2006) provided a related experimental finding by showing that limiting agents'
 choice sets can reduce positive reciprocity. However, none of these papers
 identifies the intrinsic value of decision rights. In Fehr, Herz, and Wilkening
 (2013) as well as in Owens, Grossman, and Fackler (2014), the authors cannot
 rule out that the reluctance to delegate is driven by other factors such as re-
 gret or ambiguity aversion because of the uncertainty about the agents' choices
 after delegation.6
 Finally, our findings have a bearing on the implications of high-performance
 work systems (HPWS) (Ichniowsky, Shaw, and Prennushi (1997), Ichniowsky
 and Shaw (2003), Bartling, Fehr, and Schmidt (2012)). The literature on
 HPWS argues that certain job characteristics such as workers' decision rights
 and the payment of high wages emerge jointly because employees are required
 to contribute more ideas and effort under HPWS than under traditional sys-
 tems; paying higher wages is a way to induce this contribution (Osterman
 (2006)). The empirical results on the correlation between HPWS and higher
 wage levels are mixed, however (e.g., Handel and Levine (2004), Osterman
 (2006)). This could be due to the fact that the provision of decision rights to
 workers raises their utility and thus reduces the necessity to compensate them
 with higher wages. The intrinsic value of decision rights might thus explain the
 missing link between HPWS and wage levels.
 "•Following this logic, models of empire-building (Niskanen (1971)) may be partly founded on
 an intrinsic value of decision rights.
 5Somewhat relatedly, Dominguez-Martinez, Sloof, and von Siemens (2014) studied the use of
 strategic ignorance in the delegation of real authority within a firm. They found that managers
 show a tendency towards control that seems to be driven by loss aversion. However, they did not
 provide a measurement of the intrinsic value of decision rights.
 6These authors acknowledged this fact. Fehr, Herz, and Wilkening attributed the reluctance to
 delegate explicitly to the principals' regret aversion, while Owens, Grossmann, and Fackler men-
 tioned that ambiguity aversion may "contribute and partially explain the existence of a control
 premium" in their data.
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 Finally, we believe that our results may be of value for the debate on the
 intrinsic value of "liberty" or the "freedom to choose" (e.g., Mill (1859), Sen
 (1985), Puppe (1996), Nussbaum (2000)). It is intuitively appealing to assume
 that "freedom of choice" is intrinsically valuable, but we are not aware of the
 existence of a preference based empirical foundation of the concept. There
 seems to be no precise empirical method that substantiates that individuals
 value the freedom to choose beyond the instrumental benefits that this free-
 dom provides. Perhaps our method and findings may help develop such an
 empirical foundation.
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the ex-
 perimental design for measuring the intrinsic value of decision rights in detail.
 Section 3 presents the theoretical framework behind our experimental design.
 Section 4 reports the experimental results. Section 5 discusses potential alter-
 native explanations of our results. Section 6 concludes.
 2. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
 Our elicitation method is designed to measure a principal's intrinsic value of
 decision rights, while controlling for her preferences over monetary outcomes
 as well as for her beliefs about the agent's choices after delegation. We first
 collect the principals' choices in a delegation game, and later elicit their eval-
 uations of the monetary consequences of these choices in a lottery task with
 exogenously given lotteries.
 2.1. Part 1: The Delegation Game
 In Part 1 of the experiment, we implement a one-shot delegation game, in
 which a principal is matched with an agent. Initially, the principal holds the
 decision right, which grants the right to implement a project, whose outcome
 determines the principal's and the agent's payoffs. The implementation of a
 project involves making two decisions: the choice between two possible project
 alternatives and the determination of the probability of success of the project.
 In total, the subjects participate in ten different delegation games ("rounds")
 with perfect stranger matching.
 2. 1 . 1 . The Choice of the Project Alternative
 A project can be implemented in one of two alternatives: alternative V or al-
 ternative A. The successful implementation of the project generates a private
 monetary payoff that depends on the chosen alternative. The monetary pay-
 offs for the principal and the agent are denoted by P and A, respectively, and
 the specific monetary payoffs that result from alternatives V and A are given
 by Pv or PA for the principal and by Av or Aa for the agent. If the project
 implementation is not successful, the principal and the agent receive outside
 payoffs of P0 and A0, respectively. The principal weakly prefers alternative V
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 over alternative A, and the agent weakly prefers alternative A over alterna-
 tive V. Independent of the alternative, a successful implementation is always
 preferred to an unsuccessful implementation. We thus have Pv>Pa> Po and
 Aa > Av > A0. The exact project payoffs differ across rounds of Part 1 of
 the experiment, but they are always common knowledge. Before principal and
 agent know who will ultimately hold the decision right in a given round, both
 indicate privately their intended choice of the project alternative, and this choice
 is binding for the player who ultimately holds the decision right. The intended
 chosen alternative of the player without decision right will not be relevant, and
 is unobservable for the other player.
 2. 1 .2. The Determination of the Probability of Success of the Project
 The player with the decision right not only chooses the project alternative
 but also the probability of success of the project. The "effort" level - a cho-
 sen number - that the player with the decision right devotes to the project
 determines the probability of success. Effort can be chosen from the set
 {0, 1, . . . , 99, 100} and corresponds to the percent probability that the project
 will be successful. The cost of effort is given by C(E) = k-E2 and C(e) = k- e1,
 for the principal and the agent, respectively, where E denotes the principal's
 effort choice, e the agent's effort choice, and k e {0.01, 0.02} is a cost parame-
 ter. The cost parameter k varies across rounds, but it is always common knowl-
 edge and identical for the principal and the agent.7 As with the choice of the
 alternative, before principals and agents know who will implement the project
 in a given round, both indicate their intended effort level. This choice is bind-
 ing for the player who ultimately holds the decision right, and only this player
 will bear the corresponding cost of effort. The other player's intended effort
 level will not be executed and no effort costs arise for this player. A player ob-
 serves neither the intended nor the actual effort choices of the respective other
 player.
 2.1.3. The Delegation Decision
 In our game, initially the principal always has the right to choose the project
 alternative and to determine the probability of success. Instead of keeping the
 decision right, the principal can delegate it to the agent. The principal's dele-
 gation decision is contingent on the agent's intended effort choice and on the
 minimum effort requirement e e [I, ... ,99, 100} that is determined by the prin-
 cipal.8 Delegation takes place if and only if the agent's intended effort level e is
 7In the instructions to the participants, both cost functions are presented in a table that displays
 all possible effort levels and their associated costs. In addition, the instructions contained graphs
 illustrating the cost functions.
 8We did not allow for a minimum effort requirement of 0 to ensure a minimal probability of
 non-delegation. Recall that an agent can choose an effort level of 0, that is, even if the principal
 chooses the lowest effort requirement, non-delegation might occur. The principal's own effort
 and project choice for the case of non-delegation is thus always incentive compatible.
This content downloaded from 134.21.139.233 on Mon, 19 Feb 2018 11:04:58 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 2012 B. BARTLING, E. FEHR, AND H. HERZ
 t= 1 t = 2 t = 3 t = 4 t = 5
 The agent chooses Without knowing Without knowing The principal is The decision right
an ffort level and a the agent's effort the delegation reminded of all her is either delegated
project al ernative, choice, the principal outcome, the choices and of the or not. The cho ces
 w ich is binding in se s the minimum principal ch ses resulting monetary of e play  who case he receives the effort requirement ultimately holds the
 decision right. conditional on an effort level and a lotteries. She can decision nght are
 which she will project alternative, change some or all implemented,
 delegate the which is binding in of her decisions or
 decision right. case she retains the reconfirm them,
 decision right.
 Figure 1. - The order of events in the delegation game.
 at least as high as the principal's minimum effort requirement e. Importantly,
 the principal does not know the agent's intended effort choice when she sets
 the minimum requirement. Likewise, the agent does not know the principal's
 effort requirement when he chooses the intended effort level.
 2.1.4. The Order of Events in the Delegation Game
 The order of the events in the delegation game is shown in Figure 1. First,
 the agent chooses an intended project alternative and effort level in case
 he receives the decision right. Both decisions are binding should delegation
 take place. Second, the principal chooses the minimum effort requirement
 that - together with the agent's intended effort - determines whether delega-
 tion occurs. The principal sets the minimum requirement without knowing the
 agent's intended effort choice.9 Third, before the principal learns whether the
 agent's intended effort choice matches the minimum requirement, the prin-
 cipal chooses an intended effort level and project alternative for the case in
 which she retains the decision right. Both decisions are binding should this
 case materialize.10
 Next, to ensure that the principals are fully aware of the consequences of all
 their choices, each principal is reminded of all her choices in the given round.
 Each principal is explicitly shown the monetary lottery that results for her and
 for the agent in case she retains the decision right. The principal's effort choice,
 'The principal is also not informed about the agent's choice of the alternative, but subjects
 chose the alternative with the (weakly) higher monetary payoff for themselves in 97 percent of
 the cases.
 10To control for potential order effects, we reversed the order of events in one session so that
 principals chose their intended effort level and project alternative before determining the mini-
 mum effort requirement. We do not find significant differences in mean effort choices (p = 0.61,
 two-sample i-test) and mean minimum effort requirements (p = 0.70, two-sample i-test), and
 therefore pool the data from all sessions in the subsequent analysis.
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 her corresponding effort cost, and the chosen project alternative fully deter-
 mine this lottery. At this stage, each principal is also shown a lottery that re-
 sults for her and for the agent if the agent's effort choice matches exactly the
 minimum effort requirement and if the agent chooses project alternative A.n
 The principals are then given the opportunity to either change some or all of
 their choices or to reconfirm them.
 Finally, the principal's minimum requirement and the agent's intended ef-
 fort choice are compared to determine whether the decision right is delegated
 or not, and the decisions of the party who then holds the decision right are
 implemented. The participants receive no feedback about the outcomes in a
 given round until the end of the experiment.
 2.1.5. The Parameters in the Different Rounds of the Delegation Game
 Subjects remain in the role of the principal or the agent throughout the ex-
 periment. The ten rounds differ only with regard to the payoffs in alternative
 V and alternative A of the project and with regard to the cost of effort. The
 different parameterizations are implemented to test the robustness of an in-
 trinsic value component of decision rights across different games as well as to
 test potential situational determinants of this value component. Table I gives
 an overview of the payoffs in each game. The order of the ten different games
 was randomized across sessions.
 The parameters of the ten games differ systematically with respect to two
 dimensions. First, the payoffs in games 6 to 10 are exactly twice as high as
 those in games 1 to 5. We thus systematically vary the stake size ; therefore,
 games 1-5 are labeled "low stakes" games whereas games 6-10 are labeled
 "high stakes" games. This is done to address the possibility that the intrinsic
 value of a decision right is not a fixed monetary amount but varies with the
 payoffs under consideration.
 Second, the games vary the relative monetary difference for the principal
 and the agent between alternative V and alternative A in case of success. We
 thus systematically vary the conflict of interest between the principal and the
 agent with respect to the project alternative. Conflict of interest is defined as
 the principal's relative payoff difference between project alternatives A and V,
 denoted as a = (PA - P0)/(P-p - Po). Games 5 and 10 have "no conflict of in-
 terest" (a = 1), games 1, 2, 6, and 7 have a "low conflict of interest" ( a = 0.75),
 and games 3, 4, 8, and 9 have a "high conflict of interest" (a = 0.5). This is done
 to address the possibility that the intrinsic value of a decision right, just like its
 "Note that this lottery reflects the situation in which the agent chooses the lowest possible
 effort that is compatible with delegation, that is, among all the possible lotteries that can occur
 after delegation this is the one with the lowest expected value for the principal. In all other in-
 stances of delegation, the agent chooses either a higher effort, which results in a higher success
 probability, or the principal's preferred project alternative V, or both.
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 TABLE I
 The Parameters of the Games3
 Project Successful
 Alternative V Alternative A Project Unsuccessful
 Predicted Values
 Principal Agent Principal Agent Principal Agent
 (PV) ( AV ) (PA) (AA) (Po) (Aq) k E° e°
 Game 1 220 190 190 220 100 100 0.01 60 40
 Game 2 280 235 235 280 100 100 0.01 90 60
 Game 3 180 140 140 180 100 100 0.01 40 40
 Game 4 220 160 160 220 100 100 0.01 60 60
 Game 5 260 260 260 260 100 100 0.01 80 40
 Game 6 440 380 380 440 200 200 0.02 60 40
 Game 7 560 470 470 560 200 200 0.02 90 60
 Game 8 360 280 280 360 200 200 0.02 40 40
 Game 9 440 320 320 440 200 200 0.02 60 60
 Game 10 520 520 520 520 200 200 0.02 80 40
 aThe table shows the project payoffs in experimental points for principals and agents and the corresponding cost
 parameter k. The table also shows the principals' effort choices, E°, and the minimum effort requirements, e°, that
 are optimal under the assumption of risk-neutral, selfish preferences and the absence of an intrinsic value component
 of decision rights.
 instrumental value, varies with the conflict of interest between the involved
 parties.
 At the end of the experiment, one of the ten rounds in Part 1 is randomly
 chosen to be relevant for payment. The player who holds the decision right
 in that round is given the opportunity to roll two ten-sided dice to determine
 whether the chosen project alternative is successful or not (unless the relevant
 effort level is either 0 or 100, in which case the project outcome is certain).
 The two ten-sided dice generate numbers between 1 and 100. If this number is
 below or equal to the chosen percent probability for the project success, then
 the project is successful. Otherwise, it is unsuccessful. Full feedback about the
 resulting payoffs is then given to both players.
 2.1.6. Predicted Values for Selfish and Risk-Neutral Principals
 To illustrate the behavioral consequences of the different games for an im-
 portant benchmark case, we can analyze optimal behavior of the principal un-
 der the assumption of selfish and risk-neutral preferences, and the assumption
 that decision rights carry no intrinsic value. A principal then maximizes her ex-
 pected monetary payoff in case she keeps control: max£ E • Pv + (1 - E) • Ą -
 C(E). Let E° denote the solution to this maximization problem. Given E", the
 principal then chooses e such that the expected monetary payoff in case that
 the agent chooses exactly e, e PA + (1 - e) Po, is equal to the maximized pay-
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 off in case she keeps control. This yields e° = {E°<Pv(ļ^lļ^p(E0)) • The predicted
 values E° and ď for the different games are displayed in Table I.
 2.2. Part 2: The Lottery Task
 We implement an individual decision task in Part 2 of our experiment. Each
 principal states her certainty equivalents for 20 different lotteries. Each lot-
 tery determines probabilistically the principal's own payoff and the payoff of
 another, randomly paired participant. These 20 lotteries are determined by a
 principal's own choices in the ten rounds of the preceding delegation game.12
 In each round of the delegation game, a principal's choice of E, e, and the
 project alternative defines a pair of lotteries: a control lottery and a delegation
 lottery P A principal's intended effort choice, her corresponding effort costs,
 and the chosen project alternative fully determine a control lottery. The min-
 imum effort requirement fully determines a delegation lottery. By definition,
 the latter occurs if an agent chooses exactly the principal's minimum effort re-
 quirement, incurs the associated effort cost, and chooses project alternative A.
 For example, assume that a principal chooses an intended effort level of
 E = 50 (with an associated effort cost of 25), alternative V, and a minimum
 effort requirement of e = 40 (with an associated effort cost of 16 for the agent)
 in game 1 of Part 1 of the experiment (see Table I). These choices imply the
 following two lotteries over the own and another participant's payoff:
 • Control Lottery: The principal receives 220 - 25 = 195 experimental points
 and the agent receives 190 points with a probability of 0.5, and the principal re-
 ceives 100 - 25 = 75 points and the agent receives 100 points with a probability
 of 0.5.
 • Delegation Lottery. The principal receives 190 points and the agent re-
 ceives 220 - 16 = 204 points with a probability of 0.4, and the principal receives
 100 points and the agent receives 100 - 16 = 84 points with a probability of 0.6.
 Importantly, the control lottery and the delegation lottery are exogenousfy
 given in the lottery task. In particular, we do not inform the principals that
 the 20 lotteries that they face in Part 2 are derived from their own choices in
 Part 1. The principals simply face each of the 20 exogenously given lotteries in
 an individually randomized order and specify their certainty equivalents.
 To elicit a principal's certainty equivalents, we use an incentive compatible
 mechanism first introduced by Becker, DeGroot, and Marschak (1964). For ev-
 12Here we refer to participants who are in the role of a principal in Part 1 of the experiment
 as "principals" and to the other participants as "agents" for expositional reasons only. In the
 instructions to Part 2, participants are not called principals and agents; each participant is simply
 referred to as "you," and a matched participant whose payoff might be affected by one's own
 choice is referred to as a "random other participant."
 13In the participants' instructions to Part 2, the 20 lotteries are not labeled in this way, nor are
 they distinguished in any other way. We introduce these terms here for expositional reasons only.
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 ery lottery, a principal has to indicate the smallest certain payoff - the certainty
 equivalent - that she demands in order to be willing to accept the certain pay-
 off instead of the lottery. A computerized random mechanism then determines
 the certain payoff actually offered to the principal. The offered certain payoff
 is drawn from a uniform distribution, where the bounds of the distribution are
 given by the two possible lottery payoffs for the principal. In the example of
 the control lottery above, the principal's actual certain payoff is thus uniformly
 distributed between 75 and 195 points. If the actually offered certain payoff is
 at least as high as the stated certainty equivalent, the principal receives the ac-
 tual certain payoff and the lottery is not played in this case. If the actual certain
 payoff is below the stated certainty equivalent, the lottery is played. Since prin-
 cipals face lotteries over their own as well as over a randomly matched other
 participant's income, we also need to determine a payment to the respective
 other participant in case the certain payment is chosen.14 In the lotteries de-
 rived from the choices in games 1 to 5, this fixed payment is 100 points, while
 it is 200 points in the lotteries that are derived from the choices in games 6 to
 10. These payments match those of the projects in Part 1 in case of failure.
 At the end of the experiment, two of the 20 lotteries are randomly chosen to
 be relevant for payment.15 Each principal is given feedback about the size of
 the actually offered certain payoff for these lotteries. In case the actually of-
 fered certain payoff exceeds the principal's demanded certainty equivalent, the
 principal receives the offered certain payoff and the other participant receives
 the associated fixed payment, that is, the lottery is not played out. In case a
 principal's demanded certainty equivalent exceeds the actually offered certain
 payoff, the lottery is played out. The principal is then given the opportunity to
 roll two ten-sided dice to determine the lottery outcome. Feedback is finally
 given to all participants.16
 14In this regard, our experiment is different from a typical experimental certainty equivalent
 elicitation task, in which lotteries and certainty equivalents involve only payments for the decision
 maker. Comparability with the lotteries in Part 1 makes it necessary to evaluate lotteries with
 payments to two parties. To avoid a stark discrepancy between the cases where the lottery is
 chosen and where the certain payment is chosen, the matched participant also receives a fixed
 payment in the latter case. Importantly, the fixed payment to the matched participant is constant
 within each pair of control lottery and delegation lottery.
 15Since 1 out of 10 rounds was selected for payment in Part 1, we selected 2 out of 20 lotteries
 in Part 2, to keep the selection probability constant.
 I6In Part 2, also the agents played the lottery task. This was done to entertain them during
 Part 2. Each principal thus also assumed the role of the "random other participant" in two ran-
 domly chosen lotteries and was paid according to the respectively matched agent's choices. The
 participants were only informed about the additional earnings in the role of the "random other
 participant" at the end of the experiment. Our matching algorithm ensured that no participant
 was matched with another participant more than once in Part 2.
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 2.3. Further Experimental Measurements
 Subsequent to Parts 1 and 2, further individual measures are taken. First, we
 elicit a participant's loss aversion. Second, we measure a participant's illusion
 of control. We collect these additional measures to analyze possible alternative
 explanations for a difference in certainty equivalents in Part 2. The additional
 measures are described in more detail in Section 5.
 2.4. Procedures
 We conducted three sessions with a total of 104 participants at the com-
 puter laboratory of the Department of Economics at the University of Zurich
 in October 2011 and two additional control sessions with a total of 68 sub-
 jects in November 2012. The subject pool consisted primarily of students at the
 University of Zurich and the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich.
 The experiments were computerized using the software Z-Tree (Fischbacher
 (2007)) and the recruitment was done with the software ORSEE (Greiner
 (2004)). An experimental session lasted 2 to 3 hours.
 The participants were provided with written instructions and - in the first
 two parts of the experiment - had to answer control questions to guarantee
 their understanding of the instructions. Instructions for the lottery task in Part
 2 of the experiment were handed out only after the delegation game in Part 1
 was finished. Participants knew that the experimental session would consist of
 several parts, but they did not know the content of the future parts before the
 respective instructions were provided. The instructions for the loss aversion
 task were presented on a computer screen; the instructions for the illusion of
 control task were paper based. An English translation of all instructions can be
 found in the Supplemental Material (Bartling, Fehr, and Herz (2014)).
 Payments were made for one randomly drawn round of the delegation game
 and for four randomly drawn lotteries in Part 2 (two of them in the role of
 the "random other participant"; see footnote 16). Subjects received additional
 payments in the loss aversion and illusion of control tasks. One hundred ex-
 perimental points were converted into 6 CHF, which resulted in an average
 payment of 75 CHF ($80.00 at the time of the experiment), including a 10
 CHF show-up fee.
 3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
 We begin with analyzing the principal's decision problem assuming no in-
 trinsic value of decision rights, and then extend the analysis to show how our
 mechanism allows measuring the intrinsic value.
 3.1. The Principal's Optimal Decision
 Let the principal's utility function over lotteries be given by U(L). In our
 context, a lottery L is defined by L = (x",xf,p), where x" and xj denote
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 the outcome vectors in case the chosen project is successful (s) or a failure
 (/), respectively, p denotes the probability of success, and <a e {c, d} denotes
 whether the principal holds control (c) or whether control was delegated ( d ).
 Each outcome vector specifies monetary payoffs, xj = (Xj¿p ), j = {s, /}, where
 x°'P denotes the monetary payoff to the principal and xJA denotes the mone-
 tary payoff to the agent. The principal's utility over certain monetary outcomes
 is farther given by u(xfP, xfA).
 In Part 1 of the experiment, the principal chooses an effort level E as
 well as a project alternative 6P e {A, V) for the case that she keeps control.
 These choices determine the probability of success, p(E ) = £/100, as well as
 the payoff vectors in case of success and failure, xcs(E, 6P) = (P$p^{E)) and
 X cf(E) = Thus, the principal solves the following maximization prob-
 lem:
 maxU(L(xcs, xcf, p)) = E • u(P9p - C(E), A0p)
 + (1 -E)-u(Po-C(E),Ao).
 Denote the solution to this maximization problem by E* and 61. These
 choices define the control lottery, which we denote by
 (1) U = L{xcs{E* , e*P), x}{E% p(E%
 Second, in case of delegation, the agent's effort choice e and his project
 choice 6 A e [A, V} determine the probability of success, p(e) - e/100, as well
 as the payoff vectors in case of success and failure, xs(e,eA) = {Aeycie)) and
 xj(e) = (Aq%w)- Since xds, xj, and p are determined by e and dA, we denote
 the lotteries in case of delegation by
 (2) Ld(e, 6 a ) = {xds{e, 6A), xdf(e), p(e)).
 We can now determine the principal's optimal choice of the minimum effort
 requirement after imposing some additional structure on the principal's utility
 function over delegation lotteries. First, we assume that the principal's utility
 from a delegation lottery is increasing in the probability of success and, second,
 that the principal weakly prefers if the agent chooses project alternative'P:
 Assumption 1:
 dU(Ld(e, dA)) n
 de
 Assumption 2:
 U(Ld{e,V))>U[Ld{e,A)).
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 Both assumptions are reasonable: A higher agent effort increases p(e) with-
 out affecting xdP, and hence increases her expected monetary payoff. The same
 holds if the agent chooses project alternative V rather than A. Both assump-
 tions are thus trivially satisfied for a purely self-interested principal. We discuss
 potential implications of social preferences below.17
 The delegation mechanism in our experimental delegation game allows the
 principal to set a minimum effort requirement e such that decision rights are
 only delegated in case e > e. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, it therefore follows
 that the worst lottery that the principal may face after delegation is realized if
 the agent chooses e = e and project alternative A18 We call this worst lottery
 the delegation lottery, defined as
 (3) Z/ = Ld(ę,.4).
 Assumption 1 implies that the principal's utility is weakly increasing in the
 agent's effort choice. Consequently, the principal should optimally choose her
 minimum effort requirement e* such that she delegates whenever delegation
 makes her better off compared to keeping the decision right, and she keeps
 the decision right whenever delegation would make her worse off compared to
 keeping the decision right. Figure 2 illustrates this decision.
 Suppose the principal sets the minimum effort requirement below e*, say
 at è < e*, such that U ( Lc ) > U (Ld(e_, A)). It can then happen that the agent
 chooses an effort level that is strictly in the interval [è, e*], so that delegation
 occurs but yields a strictly lower utility to the principal than U (Lc). A similar
 argument applies if the minimum effort requirement is set above ę*. Conse-
 quently, it is optimal for the principal to set the minimum effort requirement
 such that the utility of the control lottery is just equal to the utility of the dele-
 gation lottery:
 (4) U(LC) = U(L~).
 Given Assumption 1, equation (4) has a unique solution if the following as-
 sumption holds:
 Assumption 3:
 U(Ld(e = 100, .4)) > U(LC) > U(Ld{e = 1, .4)).
 17In principle, Assumptions 1 and 2 are empirically testable, but we refrained from doing this
 because we considered it highly unlikely that they will be violated.
 18For the remainder of this section, we assume that the principal believes that the agent
 chooses project alternative A. Indeed, 97 percent of subjects chose the alternative that gave them
 the higher expected payoff. Nonetheless, it may be the case that the principal believes that the
 agent chooses project V in case of delegation. Later in this section, we discuss that such beliefs
 can only bias our measurement of the intrinsic value of decision rights downwards, and we would
 hence underestimate the intrinsic value. Constructing the delegation lotteries using project alter-
 native A is thus conservative.
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 Figure 2. - The principal's utility in case of keeping control and delegation as a function of
 the agent's actual effort.
 If the principal prefers to keep the decision right in case the agent provides
 the lowest possible effort ( e = 1), and if she prefers delegatin  the decision
 right in case the agent chooses the maximum possible effort ( e = 100), then it
 follows from Assumption 1 that there exists some e such that equation (4) is
 satisfied.19
 3.2. Measuring the Intrinsic Value of Decision Rights
 Equation (4) provides the basis for measuring the intrinsic value of decision
 rights. The equation determines a control lottery and a delegation lottery that
 yield the same utility for the principal in the delegation game. Let the certainty
 equivalent CE(L) denote the certain payment to the principal that makes the
 principal just indifferent between the ex ogenousfy given lottery L and certain
 payments of CE (L) to the principal and A0 to the agent (remember that this is
 the payment to the agent in case the certain payment is chosen in Part 2 of the
 experiment). If the principal does not assign any utility to the decision right per
 se, equation (4) can only be satisfied if the certainty equivalent of the control
 19Note first that Assumption 3 is clearly met for all parameters in our experiment, assuming
 pure self-interest and risk neutrality. But if U(LC) < U(Ld(e = 1, 0A)), the principal may always
 want to delegate and thus choose the lowest possible e, and if U(LC) > U(Ld(e = 100, dA)),
 the principal may never want to delegate and thus choose the highest possible e. Consequently,
 chosen values of e = 1 or e = 100 may not reflect the principal's point of indifference between
 keeping control and delegation. If we observe choices of the lowest (highest) possible e, we may
 therefore overestimate (underestimate) the intrinsic value of decision rights. In Section 5.5, we
 present evidence from a control treatment showing that we are not overestimating the intrinsic
 value of decision rights for principals who choose the lowest possible e.
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 lottery, CE (Le), is equal to the certainty equivalent of the delegation lottery,
 CE(L-):
 (5) m(CE(Lc), A0) = M(CE(L-), A0),
 (6) CE(LC) = CE(L-).
 Therefore, in Part 2, where we confront the principals with the exogenously
 given control and delegation lotteries that they determined in the delegation
 game by their choices of E*, 6P, and £*, the certainty equivalents of the respec-
 tive pairs of lotteries should be identical.
 However, if decision rights carry value per se, utility needs to be defined not
 only over lotteries, but also over the allocation of decision rights: U(L,w),
 where w e {c, d } denotes the allocation of decision rights.20 If decision rights
 are per se valuable, indifference in the delegation game implies
 (7) U{U,c) = U{Ld-,d).
 The certainty equivalents of the exogenously given lotteries, CE(LC) and
 CE (Ld), do not contain the potential intrinsic value of decision rights. To
 account for the potential intrinsic value, we define Va as the (possibly nega-
 tive) monetary measure of the principal's intrinsic value associated with either
 having the decision right (co = c) or not having the decision right ( <o = d).
 Therefore, Vc captures potential intrinsic utility components of being in con-
 trol, whereas Vd captures (potentially negative) intrinsic utility components of
 being in a subordinate position. We can then define the following identity:
 (8) U{Lm,a) = u{C&(Lm) + Vm,A»).
 Equations (7) and (8) therefore imply that m(CE(Lc) + Vc, A0) =
 u(CE(L~) + Vd, A0). If keeping the decision right is preferred over transferring
 the decision right ( Vc > Vd), equation (7) can only hold if CE(LC), that is, the
 instrumental value of the decision right, is lower than CE(L-). In other words,
 the principal is only willing to transfer the decision right if she is compensated
 monetarily.
 20Note that Assumptions 1-3 must be satisfied for a principal's utility function defined over
 lotteries and decision rights, U(L,o>), while - for expositional reasons - we stated it above for
 U(L) only.
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 We can thus quantify the potential intrinsic value of decision rights as the
 certain amount of money that a principal demands as a compensation for the
 transfer of the decision right:21
 (9) Intrinsic Value of Decision Right = Vc - Vd = CE(L-) - CE(LC) .
 3.3. Discussion
 It is important to note that, given Assumptions 1 and 2, our measure of the
 intrinsic value accounts for the principals' unobserved risk and social prefer-
 ences. First, the indifference point between the control and the delegation lot-
 tery is endogenously chosen based on the principal's unobserved risk and social
 preferences. Since the monetary payoff consequences of the control and del-
 egation lottery are unchanged when they are presented as exogenously given
 lotteries in Part 2, these preferences similarly enter the determination of the
 certainty equivalents in Part 2. However, extreme forms of inequity aversion
 may violate Assumption 1 or 2, in which case there may not be a unique indif-
 ference point which implicitly determines the principal's compensation request
 for giving up her decision right. For example, although an increasing e always
 increases the principal's expected payoff, it may also increase advantageous
 inequality, and if the principal strongly dislikes this inequality her expected
 utility may not increase. However, such extreme forms of inequality aversion
 are implausible.22
 Moreover, our measure of the intrinsic value is independent of beliefs about
 the agent's effort. It depends only on the minimum effort requirement e, which
 does not depend on the agent's actually chosen effort. This implies that ambi-
 guity about the agent's effort choice cannot affect the measurement. More-
 over, the intrinsic value is calculated based on the conservative assumption
 that the agent chooses project alternative A in case of delegation. In principle,
 it may be the case that the principal believes that the agent chooses project
 V with positive probability in case of delegation. This would imply that the
 principal chooses e such that E9a [U (Ld(e, 0^))] = U ( Lc ) > U (L-), that is, the
 control lottery is weakly preferred to the delegation lottery as defined in (3).
 21 Equation (9) shows that our design does not allow disentangling whether a possible positive
 intrinsic value of decision rights stems from the desire to be able to affect someone else's payoffs
 (as is the case if the principal keeps control) or from the aversion to be affected by some else's
 decision (as in case of delegation to the agent), or both. Addressing this question is an interesting
 topic for future research.
 22There are several reasons for this. First, the structure of the delegation game often involves
 the choice between advantageous and disadvantageous inequality rather than the removal of any
 form of inequality. In such situations, individuals typically prefer advantageous over disadvan-
 tageous inequality. Second, if delegation occurs, the agent chooses his utility maximizing effort
 level (and project variant). Thus, if the agent chooses a very high effort level (or project variant
 V) that causes advantageous inequality for the principal, the agent is himself responsible for this
 inequality, which is likely to mitigate the principal's inequality concerns.
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 Note that this inequality even holds if the principal is ambiguity averse, because
 L- denotes the worst possible lottery in the support of the principal's beliefs.
 This biases our measurement of the intrinsic value of decision rights, as defined
 in (9), downwards, since CE(Ld(e, dA)) is smallest if dA= A. Consequently, if
 principals indeed believed that project alternative V is chosen with positive
 probability, we would underestimate the intrinsic value of decision rights.
 4. RESULTS
 4.1. The Intrinsic Value of Decision Rights
 Our first result concerns the question whether principals assign intrinsic
 value to their decision rights:
 Result 1 - Intrinsic Value of Decision Rights: The large majority of the
 principals value the delegation lotteries significantly more than the corre-
 sponding control lotteries. Thus, on average, principals value decision rights
 intrinsically.
 Figure 3 shows each principal's average certainty equivalent of the control
 lotteries on the horizontal axis and each principal's average certainty equiv-
 alent of the delegation lotteries on the vertical axis. Each of the 69 dots in
 Figure 3 thus represents one principal.
 Figure 3. - Individual principals' average certainty equivalents of the control lotteries and
 the delegation lotteries in experimental points. Each of the 69 dots represents one principal. The
 figure shows that most principals value the delegation lotteries on average higher than the control
 lotteries.
This content downloaded from 134.21.139.233 on Mon, 19 Feb 2018 11:04:58 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 2024 B. BARTLING, E. FEHR, AND H. HERZ
 If principals derive no intrinsic utility from decision rights, the average in-
 dividual certainty equivalents of these lotteries should be equal and thus lie
 on the 45° line. It is evident from Figure 3, however, that the majority of ob-
 servations lie above the 45° line. On average, the certainty equivalents of the
 delegation lotteries are 16.7 percent larger than those of the control lotter-
 ies. A one-sample /-test23 shows that this percentage difference is significantly
 larger than zero ( p < 0.001). This indicates that, on average, the principals
 assign a positive intrinsic value to decision rights.
 Figure 3 also reveals considerable individual heterogeneity in the intrinsic
 value of decision rights. The standard deviation in the average percentage dif-
 ference between the certainty equivalents of the delegation and control lot-
 teries is 15.6 percent. The large majority of principals assign positive intrinsic
 value to decision rights, while only a minority assigns a negative value. Eighty-
 three percent of the principals assign on average higher certainty equivalents to
 the delegation lotteries, whereas 17 percent of the principals do the opposite.
 A nonparametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test rejects the hypothesis that princi-
 pals value the delegation lotteries and the control lotteries equally ( p < 0.001).
 To test the robustness of our main result, we analyze whether we consis-
 tently measure a positive intrinsic value of decision rights in all ten delegation
 games. Figure 4 shows the average percentage difference between principals'
 certainty equivalents of the delegation lotteries and control lotteries for all ten
 delegation games. The figure shows that the principals assign higher certainty
 equivalents to the delegation lotteries in each of the ten delegation games, and
 the difference is statistically significant at the 1 percent level in nine out of ten
 games in both a one-sample ř-test and the Wilcoxon signed-rank test. Game 9
 Figure 4. - Average percentage difference between the certainty equivalents of the delega-
 tion lotteries and control lotteries, sorted by delegation game. Error bars represent one standard
 deviation of the percentage difference in the certainty equivalents.
 23 We use the average percentage difference in certainty equivalents of each principal as one
 observation to perform the Mest. All reported p-values refer to two-sided tests.
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 is significant at the 5 and 10 percent level only ( p = 0.02, ř-test and p = 0.06,
 Wilcoxon signed-rank test).24
 This finding is summarized in the following result:
 Result 2 - Intrinsic Value of Decision Rights in the Separate Games: The
 intrinsic value of decision rights is significantly positive in all ten delegation
 games.
 The observation that a positive intrinsic value of decision rights is found not
 only in most principals, but also across the different delegation games, lends
 support to the robustness of our finding.25
 The elicitation of the certainty equivalents in Part 2 is time consuming and
 researchers interested in measuring the intrinsic value of a decision right may,
 therefore, want to rely on a simpler proxy measure in some environments. The
 expected values of the delegation and control lotteries generated in Part 1 may
 provide the basis for such a proxy measure. For this proxy to be useful, the
 expected monetary payoffs of the delegation and control lotteries should be
 highly correlated with the certainty equivalents. We find that this is indeed
 the case. The pairwise correlation between a principal's expected payoff and
 the elicited certainty equivalent of a lottery is p = 0.89, which is highly sig-
 nificant (p < 0.001). Moreover, our measure of the intrinsic value of decision
 rights (the difference in the certainty equivalents of the corresponding con-
 trol and delegation lotteries) is positively correlated with the respective differ-
 ence in the principal's expected payoffs between these two lotteries (p = 0.58,
 p < 0.001).
 Equivalently to Result 1, we find that the expected payoffs of the delegation
 lotteries are on average larger than the expected values of the control lotter-
 ies; the difference amounts to 7.1 percent. A one-sample /-test shows that this
 percentage difference is highly significant (p < 0.001).26 Moreover, the aver-
 age difference in expected payoffs is positive for 82.6 percent of the principals,
 which is almost identical to the percentage of principals (83 percent) who value
 24We perform these tests using each principal's percentage difference between the certainty
 equivalents of the delegation and control lotteries as an observation.
 25 Further support for the robustness of our results can be found in one of the authors' Ph.D.
 thesis. In Herz (2011), 12 delegation games (all with payoffs different from those in this paper)
 were used to elicit the intrinsic value of decision rights. The findings confirm the results presented
 here. The average percentage difference in certainty equivalents between the delegation and
 control lotteries is highly significant and amounts to 14.2 percent, a large and highly significant
 majority of 92 percent of principals (33 out of 36) positively values decision rights, and the finding
 is robust across all games (significantly so at the 1 or 5 percent level in 10 out of 12 games). The
 experimental design here amends the design reported in Herz (2011), especially with regard to
 their sequential structure, it varies the payoffs more systematically, for example with respect to
 the conflict of interest and the stake size of the decision, and it adds additional measures.
 261b perform the ř-test, we averaged the percentage differences in expected values for each
 principal.
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 decision rights positively when this value is measured on the basis of certainty
 equivalents ( p < 0.001, Wilcoxon signed-rank test).
 Analogously to Result 2, we find that the principals' average expected pay-
 offs in the delegation lotteries are larger than those in the control lotteries in
 all delegation games. These differences are significant at least at the 5 per-
 cent level for eight of the ten delegation games using one-sample /-tests or
 Wilcoxon signed-rank tests.27
 Finally, we analyze whether the intrinsic value of decision rights is measured
 consistently across principals in the ten delegation games. Consistency would
 require that if principal i assigns a higher intrinsic value to decision rights than
 principal j in one game, then principal i also assigns a higher value in the other
 games, that is, that individual intrinsic values are correlated across games. One
 way to assess this consistency is to compute Cronbach's alpha, a concept fre-
 quently used in psychology and other social sciences as a measure of the in-
 ternal validity of a psychometric test score (Cronbach (1951)). Cronbach's al-
 pha measures the extent to which different items in questionnaires or - for our
 purposes - economic games measure the same latent variable. To measure this
 correlation, one could compute the correlation of the average intrinsic value of
 decision rights between the first five games and the last five games. Since this
 split is arbitrary, Cronbach's alpha is the mean of all possible split-half corre-
 lations of the games: Formally, Cronbach's alpha = ^(1 - ), where
 N is the number of games (ten in our case), var(x;) is the variance of the mea-
 sured values in the yth game, and var xi is the variance of the sum of the
 measured values in the N games. Cronbach's alpha thus measures the corre-
 lation between the games, and it varies between zero and unity. Cronbach's
 alpha is equal to 0.62 when we consider the percentage difference in certainty
 equivalents and equal to 0.77 when we consider the percentage difference in
 expected values. This suggests a relatively strong positive correlation of our
 intrinsic value measures across principals in the ten games.
 4.2. Situational Determinants of the Intrinsic Value of Decision Rights
 In this subsection, we identify two situational determinants of the intrinsic
 value of decision rights. Figure 4 reveals that the intrinsic value varies across
 the ten different delegation games. This raises the question how situational
 characteristics, that is, game specific factors, affect the intrinsic value of deci-
 sion rights. As we described in Section 2.1.6, our experimental design enables
 us to consider two potential drivers: (i) the stake size and (ii) the conflict of
 interest.
 27In games 5 and 9, the p-values are p = 0.31 and p = 0.09 for the i-tests; for the Wilcoxon
 signed-rank test, the p-values are p = 0.50 and p = 0.06, respectively.
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 Figure 5. - The left panel shows the average intrinsic value of decision rights by stake size.
 The right panel shows the average intrinsic value of decision rights by conflict of interest. The
 bars display one standard deviation of the mean.
 The stake size is systematically varied between the "low stakes" games (1-5)
 and "high stakes" games (6-10). We are interested in whether the intrinsic
 value of a decision right is simply a fixed amount, or whether it systematically
 varies with the monetary amounts under consideration. The left panel of Fig-
 ure 5 shows the average intrinsic values of decision rights for the two stake
 size levels. It can be seen that decision rights are valued about twice as high
 in the high stakes games. The difference amounts to 18.6 experimental points
 and is statistically highly significant ( p < 0.001, /-test; p < 0.001, Wilcoxon
 signed-rank test).28 This suggests that the intrinsic value of decision rights is
 not simply a small, fixed value but that it indeed scales with the stakes involved
 in the decision. This finding is summarized in the following result:
 Result 3 - Stake Size: The intrinsic value of decision rights increases with
 the monetary amounts at stake.
 The conflict of interest between the principal and the agent is systemati-
 cally varied across games by varying the principal's relative payoff difference
 between project alternatives A and V. We hypothesize that the conflict of in-
 terest between the involved parties is a driving factor not only of the instru-
 mental value but also of the intrinsic value of decision rights. This hypothesis
 is motivated by debates about the definition of power in the political science
 literature. While some scholars define power simply as being "able to make, or
 28The intrinsic value is again first averaged for each principal before a one-sample /-test is
 performed.
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 able to receive, any change" (Locke (1975[1690], p. Ill)), others postulate that
 these choices must affect another party with conflicting interests to constitute
 power (Dahl (1957), Polsby (1963), Lukes (2005)). The systematic variation of
 the payoffs across the different games allows us to analyze how the intrinsic
 value of decision rights changes when the conflict of interest changes, or when
 there is no conflict of interest in the choice of the alternative at all.
 The right panel of Figure 5 shows the average intrinsic values of decision
 rights for the different levels of conflict of interest. If individuals are motivated
 by a desire for control over another individual, and if the degree of power is
 increasing in the conflict of interest, we should observe that the intrinsic value
 of decision rights (granting power over another individual) should increase if
 the conflict of interest between parties increases.
 Our data do not support this view, and in fact point in the opposite direction.
 Figure 5 shows that the intrinsic value of decision rights is higher when there
 is no conflict of interest. While the difference between the intrinsic values of
 decision rights is not statistically significantly different between low conflict
 and no conflict of interest, the intrinsic value is significantly smaller under high
 conflict of interest compared to both low and no conflict of interest ( p < 0.01,
 respectively, using paired i-tests or Wilcoxon signed-rank tests). This is sum-
 marized in the following result:
 Result 4 - Conflict of Interest: The intrinsic value of decision rights is
 higher, the lower the conflict of interest between the principal and the agent.
 One should remember that the instrumental value of decision rights increases
 as the conflict of interest increases, since enforcing the own preferred choice
 becomes more important. The widely held intuition that individuals' value
 power, control, or decision rights particularly in situations in which there is
 "conflict" is therefore not necessarily wrong, but it is likely to be driven by
 its instrumental value. A possible explanation for Result 4 is that making de-
 cisions that are also in the best interest of another person are "comfortable"
 decisions to make. Subjects may derive more self-esteem from successful im-
 plementation if their actions also profited another person. If, however, own
 actions impinge upon the interests of another person, these psychic benefits
 might be reduced. Our data do not allow us to pin down all the relevant and
 potentially contrarious situational determinants of the intrinsic value of deci-
 sion rights. In future research, it would thus be interesting to disentangle the
 driving forces behind Result 4, and to learn more about the situational deter-
 minants of the intrinsic value of decision rights in general.
 5. alternative explanations
 We attribute the differences in certainty equivalents to an intrinsic prefer-
 ence for decision rights, but are there alternative explanations? We already
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 showed in Section 3 that risk and social preferences as well as ambiguity aver-
 sion cannot explain our results, because we controlled for these preference di-
 mensions with the experimental design. In this section, we explore and discuss
 further potential alternative explanations.
 5.1. Loss Aversion
 Loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky (1979)) might be a partial explana-
 tion for the observed size of the difference in certainty equivalents. A principal
 initially holds the decision right, and parting with this right might be perceived
 as a loss. It is important to remember, however, that some value has to be
 present for a loss to be perceived. Hence, loss aversion cannot fully explain the
 difference in the certainty equivalents, but it might contribute to its size.
 In the final part of the experiment, we elicited an individual's degree of loss
 aversion using lottery tasks, where subjects had to accept or reject a series of
 lotteries involving possible losses of different sizes X.29 The participants' deci-
 sions allow us to measure their loss aversion. The amount X at which a partic-
 ipant starts rejecting the lotteries is an indicator of his or her loss aversion. For
 example, a participant who rejects all lotteries with a potential loss of X > 3
 is classified as more loss averse than a participant who only rejects all lotteries
 with a potential loss of X > 5. 30
 Our data do not show a correlation between a subject's average intrinsic
 value of decision rights and his or her loss aversion measure (pairwise corre-
 lation coefficient: p = 0.03; p = 0.81). Our data therefore do not lend support
 to the possibility that the measured difference in the certainty equivalents is
 mainly a manifestation of the subjects' loss aversion.
 5.2. Illusion of Control
 Illusion of control is a concept from psychology that goes back to Langer
 (1975). Charness and Gneezy (2010) defined illusion of control as being "con-
 cerned with greater confidence [. . .] in a favorable outcome when one has a
 higher degree of personal involvement, even when one's involvement is not ac-
 tually relevant" (p. 134). To assess the behavioral relevance of the illusion of
 29Each participant faces six lotteries that only affect his or her own payoff. After being pre-
 sented with each lotteiy, the participant decides whether to accept it or not. Accepting involves
 a 50 percent chance of winning CHF 6 but a 50 percent chance of losing CHF X, where X takes
 on the six different values X e {2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7} in the six different lotteries. If a participant rejects
 a given lottery, he receives a payoff of CHF 0. Once all lottery decisions are taken, one of the six
 lotteries is randomly selected for actual payment and - in case of acceptance - a computerized
 random move determines the outcome. This design is adopted from Fehr and Gotte (2007).
 '"In our data, all principals had a unique switching point. However, one principal rejected
 lotteries with low losses and accepted lotteries with high losses. Exclusion of this subject does not
 change the result.
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 control, Charness and Gneezy (2010) elicited individuals' willingness to pay for
 personally rolling (instead of the experimenter rolling) a die that determined
 an individual's actual payment. They found that only a small minority of in-
 dividuals (less than 10 percent) have a willingness to pay for rolling the die
 themselves in their task.
 The findings of Charness and Gneezy (2010) cast doubt on the behavioral
 relevance of illusion of control. We nevertheless measured our subjects' illu-
 sion of control. The reason is that an illusion of control - if it existed - could
 have contributed to our main result because it could have increased the sub-
 jectively perceived instrumental value of the decision right.
 We adopted a modified version of the incentive compatible elicitation
 method used by Charness and Gneezy (2010), and elicited each principal's
 willingness to pay for the right to personally roll the two ten-sided dice that
 determine the random outcomes in Part 1 and 2 of the experiment.31 If prin-
 cipals are subject to an illusion of control, they should value rolling the dice
 positively because this increases their personal involvement in determining the
 final outcomes: If a participant opts not to roll, the experimenter casts the dice
 in front of the participant. If the participant rolls the dice, the experimenter
 watches him or her do so. In both cases, the experimenter enters the result on
 the participant's computer screen.
 In accordance with Charness and Gneezy (2010), we find that 91 per-
 cent of principals have no willingness to pay any amount for rolling the dice
 themselves. Hence, the correlation between the average individual intrinsic
 value of decision rights and the individual measure of control illusion is very
 low and even slightly negative (pairwise correlation coefficient: p = -0.05;
 ^ = 0.71).
 5.3. Preference Reversals
 It is a well-established result in experimental economics that preference re-
 versals can occur when different procedures are used to elicit preferences over
 lotteries. Slovic and Lichtenstein (1968) first demonstrated this phenomenon;
 31 Recall that there are up to three random outcomes per participant, that is, the two ten-sided
 dice might have to be rolled up to three times. In Part 1, the participant who ultimately holds
 the decision right can determine the success of the project by rolling the dice. In Part 2, two
 decisions are paid, that is, there are up to two lotteries with uncertain outcomes. The elicitation
 uses a Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism where subjects could receive 30 points in return
 for giving up the right to roll the dice themselves (in the three cases mentioned above). Subjects
 stated how many of the 30 points they are willing to pay as a price for keeping the right to roll
 the dice themselves. They stated their willingness to pay before they knew whether they kept or
 received the decision right, and which lotteries were payoff relevant. The computer then drew
 the actual price from a uniform distribution over all integers from 1 to 30 including the bounds.
 If the actual price did not exceed the stated willingness to pay, a participant kept the right to roll
 the dice and received 30 points minus the actual price. If the actual price was higher, the subject
 received all 30 points and the experimenter rolled the dice.
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 it received increased attention after a study by Grether and Plott (1979). They
 demonstrated that subjects valued some lottery A higher than a lottery B in
 a pricing task, but preferred lottery B over lottery A when faced with a bi-
 nary choice between the two lotteries. These experiments usually involve a
 pair of lotteries with comparable expected value, but one lottery offers a high
 probability of winning a modest amount of money ("high-probability lottery"),
 whereas the other lottery offers a low probability of winning a large amount
 ("high-amount lottery"). Subjects tend to prefer the high-probability lottery
 when faced with a binary choice, but assign a higher value to the high-amount
 lottery in a pricing task. This phenomenon is shown to be due to overpricing
 of high-amount lotteries in the pricing task (Tversky, Slovic, and Kahneman
 (1990)).
 Is it possible that the observed difference in certainty equivalents in Part 2
 of our experiment stems from the phenomenon of overpricing high-amount
 lotteries (relative to high-probability lotteries)? More specifically, is it possible
 that subjects characterize the delegation lotteries they face in Part 2 as high-
 amount lotteries and that they therefore place a higher certainty equivalent on
 these lotteries compared to the control lotteries?
 The principals earn a higher amount in the delegation lottery in case of suc-
 cess than in the corresponding control lottery if Pv - C(E) is smaller than PA.
 It turns out, however, that there is no systematic relationship between the suc-
 cess payoff in the control lottery ( Pv - C(E )) and the success payoff in the
 delegation lottery ( PA ). In 49.5 percent of the cases, the control lottery's suc-
 cess payoff is larger, it is smaller in 49.5 of the cases, and the success payoffs
 are equal in 1 percent of the cases. There is thus no basis for characterizing the
 delegation lotteries as "high-amount lotteries." Moreover, our pairs of control
 and delegation lotteries also do not follow the high-probability versus high-
 amount lottery pattern with respect to the probabilities of success. The average
 probabilities of success in the control and delegation lotteries are comparable;
 they amount to 60 percent in the control lotteries and to 51 percent in the
 delegation lotteries. In 49 percent of the lottery pairs, a higher probability of
 success is observed in the control lottery, while the probability of success is
 higher in the delegation lottery in 39.5 percent of the pairs. Eleven point five
 percent of the pairs have the same probability of success.
 Finally, as shown in Section 4.1, we find consistent and significant differences
 not only in the certainty equivalents, but also in the expected values between
 the control and delegation lotteries. The principal's actions in Part 1 of the ex-
 periment determine these expected values, that is, the elicitation procedure in
 the lottery task of Part 2 cannot affect them. The overpricing of high-amount
 lotteries therefore cannot explain the differences in the expected values. It is
 exactly this overpricing, however, that underlies the preference reversal phe-
 nomenon.
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 5.4. Reciprocity
 Intention based reciprocity (e.g., Rabin (1993)) could, in principle, explain
 the measured difference in certainty equivalents in Part 2 of our experiment.
 To see this, consider the following argument: A negatively reciprocal principal
 chooses a low effort level E that becomes relevant if she remains in control
 because she only keeps, by design, the decision right if the agent does not ful-
 fill her minimum effort requirement. If the principal perceives the agent's ef-
 fort choice as an "unkind act" - after all, it falls short of the minimum effort
 requirement - she may act in kind and choose a low effort level in order to
 lower the agent's expected payoff. The important consequence of this recip-
 rocal reaction is that it reduces the principal's expected payoff in the control
 lottery relative to the delegation lottery. This in turn lowers the respective cer-
 tainty equivalent, which could explain our main finding.
 However, for the reciprocity argument to be valid, when the principal re-
 tains the decision right, her perception of the agent's unfriendliness should be
 higher, the lower the minimum effort requirement: If the agent does not even
 meet a very low requirement, the agent's effort level must be very "unkind."
 Hence, the differences in the certainty equivalents between the delegation and
 control lotteries in Part 2 should - according to the reciprocity argument - be
 higher, the lower the minimum effort requirement. It turns out that the oppo-
 site is true in our data. In a regression of the percentage difference in certainty
 equivalents on the minimum agent requirement, controlling for subject and
 game fixed effects, the percentage difference in the certainty equivalents in-
 creases by 4.5 percentage points per 10 point increase in the minimum agent
 requirement ( p < 0.01, standard errors clustered at the subject level). Thus,
 the data do not appear to be consistent with an explanation based on reci-
 procity.
 5.5. Failure to Elicit the Principal's Indifference Point
 The validity of our results depends on the correct elicitation of the indiffer-
 ence point in the delegation game. Hence, a potential concern is whether sub-
 jects understood the trade-off they faced in the delegation game, and whether
 we successfully elicited the indifference point. In particular, it could be that
 (i) violations of Assumption 3 (boundary condition) bias our main result or
 that (ii) subjects are boundedly rational and did not fully understand the elici-
 tation mechanism.
 5.5.1. Corner Solutions
 We may fail to elicit a principal's point of indifference if she chooses a corner
 solution for e (see Assumption 3 and footnote 19). While principals rarely se-
 lect e = 100 (1.9 percent) in our experiment, we observe a nonnegligible share
 of e = 1 choices (15.8 percent). If a principal chooses e = 1, Assumption 3 may
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 be violated, that is, the utility derived from the control lottery U ( Lc , œ = c)
 may be strictly smaller than the utility derived from the delegation lottery
 U (L-(e = 1, A), u) = d). That is, a principal might even be willing to pay in
 order to delegate - on top of accepting a lottery in which an agent chooses
 e = 1. In our experiment, however, we did not elicit such an additional willing-
 ness to pay for delegation. Our elicitation mechanism in Part 2 may thus fail to
 elicit the principal's point of indifference in these cases and, consequently, we
 may overestimate the average intrinsic value of decision rights.
 We address this concern in several ways. First, most of our subjects never or
 rarely chose e = 1. Fifty-one percent of the subjects never chose e = 1 in our
 experiment, and 77% chose e = 1 twice at most. Therefore, for the majority
 of our subjects, violations of Assumption 3 only pose a minor problem that
 is unlikely to bias our results systematically. Second, we conducted a rather
 conservative version of the sign test for the null hypothesis that the median
 intrinsic value of decision rights is zero. The sign test is only based on data
 that indicate the sign but not the size of the intrinsic value measure. For our
 version of the sign test, we make the conservative assumption that principals
 who chose e = 1 value the decision right negatively (irrespective of the elicited
 certainty equivalents). We assign a positive intrinsic value to the decision right
 whenever the principal chose e > 1 and the corresponding certainty equivalent
 of the delegation lottery is larger than the certainty equivalent of the control
 lottery. We can then calculate how often each principal assigns a positive or
 negative intrinsic value in the ten games. We find that the number of principals
 who have a positive intrinsic value more often (49) is significantly larger, at
 the 1% significance level, than the number of subjects who have a negative
 intrinsic value more often (14).32 We also conducted a sign test for each of the
 ten games separately, and find that principals significantly more often have a
 positive intrinsic value in 8 out of the 10 games with at least 5% significance.
 We only fail to find a significant difference in games 5 and 9.
 Third, we directly addressed the question whether those principals who
 choose e = 1 indeed have a willingness to pay for delegation by conducting an
 additional control experiment with 34 subjects. Part A of this experiment was
 equivalent to Part 1 of our main treatment. It served the purpose of identifying
 principals who choose e = 1 and the games in which they do so. In Part B of the
 control experiment, we measured whether these principals are willing to pay
 for delegation. Part B was identical to Part A except for the following changes:
 (i) It was common knowledge that the agents always had to choose an effort
 of e = 1 and project alternative A in case of delegation, and that the principals
 might have to pay in order to delegate, (ii) Instead of announcing a minimum
 effort requirement as in Part A, the principals explicitly stated whether they
 wanted to keep control or delegate, (iii) If a principal kept control, she had to
 32For the remaining subjects, the number of games in which the measured intrinsic value was
 positive or negative is equal.
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 choose her implementation effort and the project alternative. But if a principal
 preferred delegation, we explicitly asked her to state her willingness to pay for
 delegation. The actual cost of delegation was drawn from a uniform distribu-
 tion between 0 and 100 points. If the stated willingness to pay for delegation
 was above the realized cost, the principal paid that actual cost and delegated
 the decision right. Otherwise, the principal kept the decision right and her cho-
 sen project alternative and effort were implemented. This procedure ensured
 that a principal had an incentive to state her true willingness to pay for del-
 egation. This willingness to pay for delegation informs us about the extent to
 which we may overestimate the intrinsic value of decision rights when corner
 solutions are chosen.
 The principals chose the corner solution e = 1 in 31 (18 percent) of 170 cases
 in Part A, but they were not willing to pay anything for delegating in Part B in 30
 out of these 31 cases. The control experiment thus shows that those principals
 who choose a minimum effort requirement of 1 almost never have a positive
 willingness to pay for delegation. We therefore conclude that our measure of
 the intrinsic value of decision rights is very unlikely to be distorted by those
 principals who choose e = l.
 5.5.2. Bounded Rationality
 While it is not clear that a possible confusion on the part of the subjects
 would lead to a systematically higher valuation of the delegation over the con-
 trol lotteries in Part 2, and not simply to more noise, we consider it important
 to highlight the measures that we took to ensure a clear understanding of the
 experimental conditions.
 First, subjects received comprehensive and detailed instructions in which the
 trade-off between keeping and delegating the decision right was explained.
 They also had to answer detailed control questions correctly before they were
 allowed to participate in the experiment. In particular, principals were explic-
 itly instructed to think about their point of indifference when choosing the min-
 imum effort requirement: They were told to consider that the agent chooses
 some effort e, and to decide whether they would be willing to delegate the
 decision right to the agent if he chooses precisely this effort level. If they prefer
 keeping the decision right in this case, they were instructed to repeat the exer-
 cise assuming that the agent chooses an effort of e + 1. It was then explained to
 them that they should set the minimum requirement exactly at agent's lowest
 effort level at which they prefer delegation. Hence, principals were instructed
 in a way that should lead them to reveal their point of indifference.33
 33To avoid anchoring the principals to high effort values, the numerical example in the instruc-
 tions started with an agent effort of 1. Consequently, if anchoring is a concern, it would work
 against our hypothesis, since it would create delegation lotteries of low value.
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 Second, principals were given the possibility of revising their choices dur-
 ing the experiment. After having chosen the minimum effort requirement and
 their own effort in case they retain the decision right, principals were shown
 the consequences of these choices side-by-side on their computer screen.34 In
 particular, they were shown the consequences of delegation assuming that the
 agent chooses precisely the minimum requirement (and project alternative A),
 that is, the worst possible outcome after delegation, and the consequences of
 keeping the decision right (given their own effort and choice of the alterna-
 tive). Note that these are precisely the outcomes that define the control and
 the delegation lotteries. At this stage, principals had the possibility of revising
 all their choices, that is, they could change the minimum requirement or the
 own effort choice if they wished to do so. This design feature allowed them to
 fine-tune their choices in the delegation game in order to facilitate the revela-
 tion of the point of indifference.
 Further, the data indicate that the principals understood the trade-offs they
 faced when setting the minimum effort requirement well. In Table I, we present
 predicted values for the minimum requirement assuming that principals are
 risk neutral and purely self-interested, and do not derive intrinsic value from
 the decision right. While we should not expect the observed values to co-vary
 perfectly with these predictions, they are a useful benchmark for the variation
 in the actual minimum requirements across games. A regression of the chosen
 minimum effort requirements on the predicted values for e in Table I confirms
 that the requirements vary as expected. The coefficient on the predictions is
 0.74 ( p < 0.01), that is, if the prediction increases by 1 point, the actually cho-
 sen minimum effort requirement increases by 0.74 points.35 Hence, the princi-
 pals react strongly and in the predicted direction to changes in the delegation
 trade-off, which is further evidence that our subjects understood the experi-
 mental conditions well.36
 34 An English translation of the instructions to the principal can be found on p. 2 of the Supple-
 mental Material, and the Screenshots of the principals' screen sequence in the delegation game
 can be found on p. 15 of the Supplemental Material.
 35 Standard errors in the regression are clustered on the subject level.
 36One specific form of bounded rationality would be to assume that principals form expec-
 tations about others' behaviors in the lab or in real life by analogy with more familiar setups
 in which they know more about the effect of their actions on others (Samuelson (2001), Jehiel
 (2005)). It could then be that principals expect their agents to shirk strongly after delegation, and
 this could induce principals to set suboptimally high minimum effort requirements to avoid that
 delegation occurs. Note, however, we must assume that the subjects fundamentally misunder-
 stood the delegation mechanism in our experiment for this explanation to be valid because the
 principal's beliefs about the agent's effort are completely irrelevant for the optimal choice of the
 minimum effort requirement. Keep in mind that subjects were only allowed to participate in the
 experiment if they correctly answered all control questions. In addition, as described above, we
 devoted much effort in the instructions to explain the logic of setting an optimal minimum effort
 requirement.
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 6. CONCLUSION
 In this paper, we provide evidence that individuals value decision rights in-
 trinsically, demonstrate the robustness of this finding across different game
 parameterizations, and find that the magnitude of the intrinsic value of deci-
 sion rights is correlated across individuals and parameterizations. These results
 provide evidence for the existence of non-transferable private benefits of con-
 trol, the implications of which have been studied intensively in the theoretical
 corporate finance, governance, and organizational economics literatures. Evi-
 dence for the existence of such "psychic" private benefits makes a strong case
 for the relevance of the incomplete contracting approach in these literatures.
 What determines the size of the intrinsic value of decision rights? In this pa-
 per, we can only provide preliminary answers to the situational determinants of
 intrinsic value. We find that stake size matters. Doubling the stake size involved
 in a decision roughly doubles the intrinsic value component. With regard to the
 conflict of interest between the principal and the agent, a first intuition might
 suggest that the intrinsic value of decision rights is larger, the larger the con-
 flict of interest. If their interests are perfectly aligned, for example, having the
 decision right might not be intrinsically valuable since the power relationship is
 less pronounced. Our data, however, point in the opposite direction. Our inter-
 pretation is that decisions where the pursuit of self-interest runs counter to the
 interests of another party have an "unpleasant" component attached to them,
 which reduces the intrinsic value of decision rights. This effect might go so far
 that the intrinsic value of decision rights may even turn negative in situations
 with undesirable outcomes. This would be consistent with recent experimental
 findings on the attribution of responsibility for unfair decisions (Bartling and
 Fischbacher (2012)). We consider gaining further insights into the situational
 determinants of the intrinsic value of decision rights to be an interesting field
 for future research.
 The finding that individuals intrinsically value decision rights naturally leads
 to the question of the ultimate reason why people value decision rights beyond
 their instrumental benefits. One potential source stems directly from having
 or not having decision rights. Social psychologists argue that "human needs,"
 such as power (McClelland (1975)) or autonomy (Deci and Ryan (1985)) con-
 stitute the source of the intrinsic value of power and autonomy. While the need
 for power implies that individuals value decision rights positively, the need for
 autonomy is potentially based on an aversion against being subordinate. Al-
 ternatively, decision rights could be intrinsically valuable because the utility
 received from specific outcomes depends on whether the outcome is a conse-
 quence of one's own actions, the actions of someone else, or not the conse-
 quence of a choice at all. For example, Nozick (1974, pp. 48-51) argued that a
 person who shapes his own life according to his own plan gives meaning to that
 life. Hence, the same outcome may be more valuable if it is self-chosen rather
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 than imposed by someone else.37 Further exploring these potential sources of
 the intrinsic value of decision rights provides exciting avenues for future re-
 search.
 37Mill (1859, Chapter III) put forward a similar argument in his defense of liberty: "He who lets
 the world, or his own portion of it, choose his plan of life for him, has no need of any other faculty
 than the ape-like one of imitation. He who chooses his plan for himself, employs all his faculties.
 He must use observation to see, reasoning and judgment to foresee, activity to gather materials
 for decision, discrimination to decide, and when he has decided, firmness and self-control to hold
 to his deliberate decision. And these qualities he requires and exercises exactly in proportion
 as the part of his conduct which he determines according to his own judgment and feelings is a
 large one. It is possible that he might be guided in some good path, and kept out of harm's way,
 without any of these things. But what will be his comparative worth as a human being? It really is
 of importance, not only what men do, but also what manner of men they are that do it."
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